law

This week the European Parliament votes on whether to save the Internet or kill it

This week, on September 12, the European Parliament is going to vote on a bill that threatens to irreparably damage the Internet as we know it. Under the guise of copyright reform, there are are a number of “reforms” that are going to cripple fundamental rights online.

One of them is Article 11 of the bill, which it was desired to ban creating links to press articles unless one previously asks and receives permission to do so. Over the course of negotiations, it was watered down slightly from banning linking to banning displaying snippets of the linked content (a.k.a. quoting the article). Even just this would be a terrible change because it would create a disparity between how quoting online references (limited by article 11) and quoting offline/offline references (one of the cornerstone copyright exceptions in copyright laws worldwide without which the current copyright regimes would be unacceptable).

The other is Article 13 of the bill, which, as it is written now, would mandate the implementation of upload filters by all online platform service providers. This would have profound repercussions on fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of association and freedom of the press to name just a few. Starting from Article 13, it comes down to absurd consequences such as a de facto ban on memes, a ban on open-source code repositories such as GitHub and so on.

There are other issues too, such as Article 3 which would prevent the data mining of freely available online content.

There are just a couple of days left until the Plenary vote of the European Parliament. The #SaveYourInternet campaign is one of the multiple efforts trying to prevent this disaster from happening.

More details on this can be found here:

Intelligence sharing without effective oversight in Romania

Intelligence sharing, according to the US Department of Homeland Security (via. Wikipedia) is “the ability to exchange intelligence, information, data, or knowledge among Federal, state, local or private-sector entities as appropriate.” To this US-centric definition, Wikipedia adds “Intelligence sharing also involves intergovernmental bilateral or multilateral agreements and through international organizations. Intelligence sharing is meant to facilitate the use of actionable intelligence to a broader range of decision-makers.”

In the real world, however, intelligence sharing is, most of the time, an opaque process that lacks effective oversight and control.

One example of a completely out-of-control intelligence sharing operation is revealed in Edward Snowden‘s leaks. In the leaks there are documents that shed light on the fact that the NSA has been collaborating with intelligence agencies from 33 other countries at the time of the leaks. Were all those agreements between the parties of this network established following transparent procedures by democratically elected bodies? Given the parties involved and what we’re about to find out below, the answer is most likely “No”.

In Romania, the intelligence services were flatly denying any intelligence sharing with the NSA: “There was never any secret accord or protocol or deal between SRI, as the national authority for communications investigations and the NSA” was what then SRI (Romanian Intelligence Service) director George Maior was claiming. At all debates on various privacy-shredding SRI-supported bills, whenever their authority was contested by reasons of them being a militarized and completely opaque organization that is beyond effective oversight, they were always defaulting back to the position that they are overseen by a democratically elected body, namely the parliamentary SRI oversight committee. Replies that the parliamentary intelligence oversight committees were less intelligence oversight committees and to a much larger degree intelligence cheerleading committees were falling on deaf ears.

But, to paraphrase the Buddha, “three things cannot be long hidden: the sun, the moon, and the truth”. At the end of 2017, as a result of a open letter to the Romanian parliamentary intelligence oversight committees which was sent by the Association for Technology and Internet and Privacy International, the SRI parliamentary oversight committee gave a much more candid answer than anybody was expecting.

We find out that the committee can ask for access on anything, and the service is compelled to respond, but only if it is not about “the documents, data and information related to intelligence activities concerning national security which are currently taking place or which will be taking place in the future, considered as such by the Committee, at the recommendation of the Supreme Defence Council, as well as the information which could lead to breaking of the cover of operatives, to the identification of sources, of concrete methods and means of work used in intelligence gathering, to the extent that these do not infringe on the Constitution and standing legislation.” This isn’t even that big of a revelation, given that this is an excerpt of the regulation outlining the authority of the intelligence oversight committees – which is little to none when it comes to relevant current activities of the intelligence services. But that is not all. We find out that “[…] concerning the access of the Committee’s members to relevant information regarding state intelligence sharing, given its purview and the concrete situations which came to the attention of the Committee, these informations can be obtained upon request and with the accord of the involved parties.” So oversight happens only if “the involved parties” agree.

Then we find out that “the Committee’s competences are exercised only in relation to the SRI, not in relation with the Government/State. As a consequence, there is no general mandate given to the Committee to perform an independent control of the intelligence sharing activities of the Government/State.” – so it seems that the SRI parliamentary oversight committee publicly states that the intelligence sharing activities of the SRI flat out lack any oversight whatsoever.

Finally, we find out that “Intelligence sharing between SRI and partner intelligence services from other countries are done according to the rules established through cooperation protocols between SRI and similar foreign organizations, while respecting established norms.” If the previous quote may have not been clear enough, this one puts the issue to rest, clearly stating that the terms of all intelligence sharing agreements entered by the SRI are are completely at the latitude of the SRI and their partners, without any oversight, democratic or otherwise apart from “respecting established norms”. They could have skipped the “respecting established norms” altogether and it wouldn’t have made any difference.

So it seems that all those “crazy” people complaining about the lack or oversight weren’t, in fact, paranoid. They were just reading between the lines correctly.

New Comparative Analysis on Internet Blocking: Focus on Ukraine, Russia, and Turkey

The world we live in gave us global Internet, universal right to freedom of expression, but also selective application of national laws to online space. When starting the analysis a few questions were set out as a reference point: Is modern Internet still the same as it was constructed by its founders? How much discretion should the governments enjoy when deciding on the limitations of Internet freedom? These and many other collateral questions are subject of heated discussions at all international forums related to Internet governance and human rights. And while answers are not there, Internet freedom is in danger for many years in a row. If proper actions won’t be taken by international community, we may witness even worse decline of freedom of expression in the upcoming years, and very likely in the countries that gave no alarm signals before. There is also a common misbelief that blocking is something possible and feasible in technologically advanced countries. We decided to check whether technological sophistication and censoring policies always go hand in hand, using the examples of Ukraine, Russia, and Turkey.

The comparative analysis consistently unveils legal framework for Internet freedom, specifics of Internet blocking, statistics naming the most hostile governments, results of Internet freedom survey in Ukraine, as well as restrictive practices implemented in the region by Ukraine, Russia, and Turkey. It concludes with a number of recommendations addressed to the governments in order to ensure proper respect and protection for Internet freedom. 

Text is available in English and Ukrainian

The comparative analysis “Internet Blocking: Fragmenting Network & Violating Freedoms” was prepared by a non-governmental organisation “Digital Defenders Partners” (DDP) within the framework of the project “Securitization of Internet Freedom” implemented under the support of the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative (ABA ROLI).

Take the first steps in understanding online and offline freedom of expression

ApTI together with the Internet Freedom Network partners under the Internet Freedom Program launched cases.internetfreedom.blog. It is a project with the purpose of teaching people about online and offline freedom of expression using the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence. The project is accompanied by a brochure which you can download in .pdf format.

The Internet significantly changed our lives in many respects, including the way we access published information. But, most importantly, it enhanced our exercising of our freedom of expression both by allowing easy access to sources of information and by the liberalization of publishing any kind of information. This transformed freedom of expression, especially online, into something everybody is interested in.

How did the project came to be

First, the subject seems to be of interest not just for professional journalists but for all types of Internet users with various educational backgrounds and, usually, little legal knowledge. Nevertheless, they are all involved in communication on the Internet and they sometimes claim that their freedom of expression is being infringed upon.

Secondly, the decision making process in regard to the freedom of expression seems frequently rushed, without enough time being dedicated to real public debate and evidence-based policymaking. This is particularly true in some countries in South-Eastern Europe. As a consequence, fragments from ECHR argumentations and conclusions can be used as widely accepted references and, thus, as useful tools in debates.

Thirdly, being faced with the huge flow of available information nowadays, many users are looking for summarized, easy to understand information in order to form and opinion.

On the project’s page you can find out what freedom of expression is, what its limits are and why it is sometimes restricted by governments.

freex

How to understand the project page and the brochure

The presented cases should be use only as a point of reference. The ECHR jurisprudence is always evolving, sometimes in self-contradictory ways. Sometimes it can be criticized because, sometimes, it can have disappointing results for supporters and advocates of the fundamental human right to the freedom of expression. Furthermore, the technological evolution of the Internet can change some fundamental assertions that today we hold as true.

The summarization of the current ECHR jurisprudence comes at a cost that needs to be mentioned. First, the information in this brochure in no way constitute legal advice. Secondly, the editors needed to limit the information they had in order to keep the brochure succinct enough, which is something that some legal professionals could consider as a limitation. Also, for brevity’s sake, we were forced to cover some important aspects only summarily, such as “hate speech” or “protection of journalistic sources”

Article by George Hari Popescu, ApTI Romania, original article in Romanian: https://apti.ro/freex-apti-ro-cazuri-cedo-libertate-exprimare-sectiune-brosura

Romanian MEPs you’ve got mail! Over 100 postcards saying no to link tax and Internet censorship

FotoJetIn the last month, more and more Romanian voice are gathering to send out a clear message to decision makers: We don’t want link taxes and upload filters!

Besides calling and sending letters to Romanian MEPs to delete Articles 11&13 from the copyright reform proposal, EDRi member ApTI organised a series of activities to trigger more public attention regarding the damaging copyright reform proposals. Along with 57 other civil rights organizations, we also signed the Civil Liberties Union for Europe open letter to stop the censorship machine. (more…)

Regulating Inadmissible Internet Content – Georgia in Need of Legal Changes

The Institute for Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI), a Tbilisi based non-governmental organization working on the issues of the Internet, e-governance and public administration reforms, published a policy paper about internet regulations and proposed some legislative changes in order to prevent excessive restriction of the freedom of expression in future in Georgia.  (more…)