The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Moldova, approved by the Parliament on December 15, 2023, is designed for a six-year term and envisages the harmonization of the national legal framework with the set goals and objectives. The legislative activity will also take into account the need to fulfill the preconditions for the country’s accession to the European Union. According to experts, a clear and thoughtful approach should be applied in the development of legislative changes related to the implementation of the provisions of the National Security Strategy, on a multi-stakeholder basis, in order to avoid possible abuses and ambiguous interpretation.
The Strategy is positioned as a document that provides a guide for adapting to the security environment. In this sense the Strategy is a reference document for all central and local public authorities with responsibilities in the field of national security and defence. The Supreme Security Council is responsible for coordinating the uniform application and monitoring the implementation of the Strategy, and will regularly review the security situation.
It should be noted that the basic reason for the elaboration and approval of the new Strategy is indicated as the will of citizens to live in a democratic and pluralistic society, where the state acts in the interest of all. A key element is the following statement: the Republic of Moldova sees its future as a state that protects fundamental rights, ensures security and favourable conditions for the fulfilment of the needs of its citizens.
Another moment is the recognition that substantial investment is needed in the civilian security sector to increase the professionalism of the workforce and to equip it properly with modern technologies … the rapid and effective exchange of information and cooperation between institutions.
The national security objectives of the Republic of Moldova include guaranteeing fundamental human rights, the safety of citizens and their property. It should also be noted that there are statements on the implementation of measures to protect investigative media.
The analysis by the Association “Comunitatea Internet” found that the Law on state security on the subject of threats to state security provides for a narrower approach containing only disinformation actions that can only affect the constitutional regime. The dated formula can potentially mislead the work of other state security bodies that are not directly responsible for preventing and combating disinformation, manipulation of information and subversive activity of foreign entities.
As a result, these uncertainties can affect the state and civil society through inadequate threat management and unsynchronised activities by public authorities to mitigate damage and prevent threats. Or these uncertainties may lead to some slippages and as a result the negative effects may be greater.
One of the problems mentioned in the National Security Strategy is the lack of an integrated crisis management mechanism. As well as the stated aim of raising the level of national resilience, in particular information and cyber security and resilience.
In this sense, the Law on state security bodies needs to be adjusted by introducing a mechanism for integrated crisis management with ensuring rapid and effective information exchange and cooperation between institutions; ways to raise the level of national resilience by raising the level of resilience of state security bodies. An important aspect would also be to take into account the risks associated with developments in the field of information and communication technologies and to give priority to the appropriate equipping with modern technologies.
It should be noted here that the national framework has some good examples of sectoral crisis management systems and obligations of transparency and guarantees of proportionality between state action and human rights and freedom of expression. The first example is the Law on preventing and combating terrorism, which has a well-defined crisis management mechanism. Another example is the Law on cyber security.
Another problem mentioned in the National Security Strategy is the low level of cyber hygiene among public officials and the population. In this sense the National Institute for Cyber Security Innovations “Cybercor” is meant to cover this topic among civil servants. What concerns civil society remains uncovered. Here it is worth mentioning various initiatives of public associations, addressed to different vulnerable/marginalized groups of civil society, i.e. communities that are at higher risk of having their rights and freedoms restricted than others (people with disabilities; asylum seekers and refugees; women, children, elderly people; activists, etc.). The state’s declaration of the need to raise the level of cyber hygiene of the population would require some national programs, at least to unite the efforts of organisations already making such efforts.
The implementation of mechanisms to monitor and respond rapidly to information challenges by establishing systems to enable early detection of disinformation campaigns and prompt intervention to correct misinformation, involving collaboration and partnerships with private entities, seems very dubious. This provision is part of the Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation, Information Manipulation and Foreign Interference Concept for 2024-2028.
Creating mechanisms to educate the public first requires some methodologies to accurately classify actions as disinformation and manipulation of information. Only after broad discussions with all stakeholders on the given methodology can it be presented to the general public as a national guide. Otherwise some legal and technological interpretations may arise, as well as potential elements of limitation of free speech.
The use of monitoring and data analysis tools to identify, investigate and counter the dissemination of false or manipulative information is a declarative element only. It needs to be developed as a document, discussed in particular with the technical community to ensure the fairness and applicability of this mechanism in compliance with international legal norms and generally accepted principles of freedom of expression and human rights in the virtual environment. The procedure is rather unclear in cases, where the application of the mentioned instruments requires financial expenditure from natural and/or legal persons or could lead to damage as a result of failure to fulfil obligations towards beneficiaries. In particular, it should be noted that the national legal framework expressly provides that “damages, including lost profit, incurred by the undertaking as a result of the fulfilment of provisions given by the authorities … shall be made good …“. The associated risks are usually part of the final price to be paid by the beneficiaries of the product or service. In the given context guaranteed access to information will cost society more which may lead to unfavourable conditions for free expression through the virtual environment.
The Strategy mentioned new trends and technologies. In this sense it is worth noting the migration of the population towards viewing mainly social media channels (e.g. Telegram, TikTok, Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, Twitter) and blogs. This phenomenon is dictated by the convenience of learning information only to the limit of minimal interest. The given trend has spawned niche resources such as digital influencers and bloggers. To a certain extent they, not being affiliated journalists, engage in activities related to the profession of a journalist.
The role of digital influencers in information sharing has become even more important as most people consume information and news exclusively through social media platforms. The personal beliefs of digital influencers, as well as misinformation, can affect the personal opinions of followers.
Disinformation and manipulation require a target audience and the means to convey the idea to the target audience. The effectiveness of disinformation and manipulation is determined by the ratio of the actual number of supporters attracted to the planned number.
Today, influencers are the ones who have the audience, the means and the methods of transmitting ideas. The benefits of digital influence channels for the disinformation and manipulation team include reaching the right audience, desired tone and credible communication.
Promoting the principles of transparency and accountability in the media by supporting efforts to strengthen ethical standards should also be applied to digital influencers.
The Association “Comunitatea Internet” has developed a number of recommendations regarding the significant risks that may arise as a result of improper implementation of the National Security Strategy, including:
- Elaboration of a draft adjustment/modification of the national regulatory and policy framework by ensuring the objectives of the National Security Strategy, the Law on the Centre for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation and in ensuring the transposition of the risks and vulnerabilities mentioned in the National Security Strategy;
- Drafting a new law or adjusting an existing one by introducing and describing an integrated crisis management mechanism ensuring rapid and effective information exchange and cooperation between institutions;
- Reviewing the national regulatory and policy framework to ensure the objective of the National Security Strategy to take into account the risks associated with developments in the field of information and communication technologies as a priority and to ensure the appropriate equipping with modern technologies, with the large- scale participation of technical environment and representatives of civil society;
- The introduction throughout the national legal framework and for all branches of the national economy and state activity of an obligation for state institutions and the private sector to inform transparently the users of the services they provide, who could be affected by the threat in question, of the measures, including corrective measures, that they could take to avoid the materialisation of the threat in question;
- Develop methodologies to accurately classify actions as misinformation and manipulation of information to avoid abuse and situations of dubious interpretation. Only following broad discussions with all stakeholders on the given methodology, it can be presented to the general public as a national guide;
- Promoting the principles of transparency and accountability in the media by supporting efforts to strengthen ethical standards would also need to be applied to digital influencers who through various social media or other personalized information posting resources (such as Telegram, TikTok, Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, Twitter) as well as the media post and/or retaliate information;
- In the context of legal provisions for the use of monitoring and data analysis tools to identify, analyse and counteract the dissemination of false or manipulative information requires to be developed as a document, discussed in particular with the technical environment to ensure the fairness and possibility of applying this mechanism in compliance with international rules of law and generally accepted principles of fundamental freedoms and human rights in the virtual environment. Here it is necessary to describe the cases, in which the application of the mentioned instruments requires financial expenditure from natural and/or legal persons or could lead to damage/damage as a result of failure to fulfil obligations towards beneficiaries;
- Establish an independent digital ombudsman to handle complaints about the compartment, statements and actions of digital influencers.
When reviewing the above-mentioned framework, the right of citizens to information on the work of state security bodies and on issues related to their personal interests, mentioned in the Law on state security and the Law on state security bodies, should be taken into account.